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Abstract: The combat features of the Ground Based Air Defence Systems represent the potential of 
search,  discovery,  indicate,  combat  and  destruction  of  the  enemy's  air  assets  and  the  ability  to 
manoeuvre of forces and combat means, for the purpose of capturing the enemy's airspace and avoid 
actions and attack to defend objectives (of troops) assigned in the area of responsibility tacking into 
account the conditions established by the mission. 
The paper is focused on a comparative study on the possibilities of target destruction of the Air Air 
Defence Systems (antiaircraft artillery and Surface-To-Air Missiles). 
Two situations were chosen: for the first case, related to S1, S2 and S3, we’ve assumed the presence of 
a flying target describing a uniform rectilinear trajectory both in the presence and in the absence of 
the enemy’s electronic jamming. For the second case concerning S4 we’ve assumed that the target 
changed its angle of flight. 
Key Words: Ground Based Air Defense, Integrated Systems, Single shoot hit probability.
1. INTRODUCTION
As a result of the increasing share of aviation decisive action, studies are conducted in most 
armies and upgraded and new types of weapons and military equipment are utilized along 
with improved combat tactical methods and concepts in order to permanently maintain a 
high performance combat artillery and Surface-To-Air Missiles subunits. 
According to military experts improving the quality of Air Defense relies on increasing 
the probability of hitting aerial targets up to one hundred percent. 
The developed Western countries allocate huge funds for research and production of the 
air  defense  military  equipment,  and  maintaining  in  this  purpose  the  high  technological 
capabilities. 
To ensure a possible effective antiaircraft riposte to all heights,  the future trend will 
consist in integrating anti-aircraft guns and rockets in the next generation defense systems. 
The system of aerial targets destruction performs, in fact, the fundamental mission of 
retaliatory anti-aircraft system, finishing the task of fighting and destruction of the enemy 
during the fight exercise. 
For fighting the air targets there are used both artillery systems and anti-aircraft missile 
systems. 
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2. GROUND BASED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM - S1 
2.1 Without using the radioelectronic jamming by the enemy 
Considering the characteristics of the target, on the one hand, and those of the system S1 [13], 
[14], on the other hand, according to table 1, it results the possbilities of destruction without 
using the radioelectronic jamming. 
For all three systems (antiaircraft artillery) we considered the fire rate to be a half of 
theoretical fire rate in order to achieve results as close as possible to the actual situation. 
Table 1 – Initial elements 
Characteristics  System of units  S1  S2  S3 
Rate of fire  [hits/min]  500  550  60 
Shooting range on target  [m]  3500  3500  3500 
Target speed  [m/s]  300  300  300 
Subsystems  Number of pieces  6  4  6 
Single shoot hit probability  %  0,0021  0,0022  0,0032 
According to relation [5]: 
T
ZT
V
D
t    (1) 
where: 
  ZT D = the flight distance of the target in the fire area of the system, [m]; 
  T V = the flight speed of the target, [m/s]. 
The flight duration of the target in the action area (t) is 11,667 [sec]. 
s t 667 , 11
300
3500
 
 
The rate of fire, [hits/sec] 8. 
8 333 , 8
60
500
   
The number of projectiles fired by S1 is obtained by multiplying the duration of the 
flight target in the action area (11,677 s) by the rate of fire (8 hits/s) and the number of guns 
(6 guns), and it is equal to 93. 
N = t  ﺡ  nt  (2) 
when applied relation (2), 
560 496 , 560 6 · 8 · 677 , 11    fired projectiles 
To calculate the hit probability of aerial target with „n” projectile we applied relation (3) 
1 1 / ) (
P N
A D N e P       (3) 
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  A D N P / ) ( = probability of destruction of aerial target with „n” projectiles; 
  1 P = single shot hit probability; 
  N = the number of the executed shots; 
  e = 2,71828. 
 Hence we get: 
0021 , 0 · 560
560 1    e P
, 
176 , 1 0021 , 0 · 560 · 1   P n
,  n
n
e
e but e P
1
... 1 176 , 1
560       
176 , 1
176 , 1 1
e
e  
,    
241 , 3 176 , 1  e ,      309 , 0
241 , 3
1

,  
691 , 0 309 , 0 1 560    P  
The following result shows that the aerial target is not destroyed because the probability 
of destruction is smaller than 0,8. 
2.2 Using of the radioelectronic jamming by the enemy 
Comparing the characteristics of the target, and those of the system S1 and the coefficients 
involved in the use of jamming by the enemy, we obtain the possibilities of destroying with 
S1, in jamming conditions, as presented in table 2. 
The probability of indicating, and preparing for the fight situation, and the coefficient of 
stability at passive jamming are also presented in table 2. 
Table 2 – Initial elements for jamming conditions [1], [2], [5] 
Characteristics    S1  S2  S3 
Rate of fire  [hits/min]  500  550  60 
Distance of shooting on target  [m]  3500  3500  3500 
Target speed  [m/s]  300  300  300 
Subsystems  Number of pieces  6  6  6 
Single shoot hit probability    %  0,0021  0,0021  0,0032 
Probability of indicating    1  0,6  0,6 
Preparing for fight situation  %  0,8  0,8  0,8 
The coefficient of  jamming stability  %  0,75  0,75  0,75 
Regarding the previous data, note that: 
  the flight time of the target in the action system area (t) is 11,667 s. 
  the rate of fire, in hits/s is 8. 
  the number of projectiles fired by the system is 560. 
  probability  of  destroying  for  560  projectile,  without  using  the  radioelectronic 
jamming is 0,691. 
Replacing in relation: 
CRT SPL I A D N D N P P P
A CB       / ) ( ) ( /   (4) 
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 
A CB D N P
/ ) ( = probability of destruction of aerial target with „n” projectiles, in 
radioelectronic jamming conditions; 
  I P = probability of indicating, with values: 
o  0,6 ￷ 0,8 under non-automated arrangements; 
o  0,8 ￷ 0,9 under automated ones; 
  SPL  =  preparing for fight coefficient  of the fire control system; 
  CRT  = the coefficient of  stability at  jamming. 
The possibilities of destroying an aerial target – number of destroyed aerial target – 
result from relation (5): 
where: 
  A D N T / ) ( = possibility of destroying an aerial target; 
 
A CB D N A D N P
/ ) ( sau    / ) ( = probability of destroying an aerial target that does not 
use a radioelectronic jamming and probability of destroying an aerial target 
that uses a radioelectronic jamming, respectively. 
Hence we obtain: 
415 , 0 75 , 0 · 8 , 0 · 1 · 691 , 0   
The aerial target is not destroyed because the probability of destruction is smaller than 0,8. 
3. GROUND BASED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM – S2 
3.1 Without using the radioelectronic jamming by the enemy 
Based on data related to S2 centralized in table 1, the possibilities of annihilation are obtained 
without the use of radioelectronic jamming by the enemy, as presented in table 3. 
According to relation 3, the flight duration of the target in the action area (t) is 11,667 s. 
s t 667 , 11
300
3500
 
 
The rate of fire, in hits/s is 9. 
9 167 , 9
60
550
   
The number of projectiles fired by system S2 is  420. 
420 372 , 420 4 · 9 · 677 , 11    fired projectiles 
According to relation 3 the probability of destroying with 420 projectiles is 0,603. 
0022 , 0 · 420
420 1    e P
            
603 , 0 397 , 0 1 420    P  
The aerial target is not destroyed because the probability of destruction is smaller than 0,8. 
3.2 Using the radioelectronic jamming by the enemy 
Following  the  same  algorithm  based  on  data  centralized  in  table  2,  the  possibilities  of 
annihilation obtained with the use of radioelectronic jamming by the enemy, are presented in 
table 3. 
A CB D N A D N A T A D N P N T
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The probability of indicating,and preparing for fight situation, and the coefficient of 
stability at passive jamming are presented in table 2, 
Regarding the previous data, note that: 
  The flight duration of the target in the action area (t) is 11,667 s. 
  The rate of fire, in hits/s is 9. 
  The number of projectiles fired by the subunit is 420. 
  Probability  of  destroying  for  420  projectile,  without  using  the  radioelectronic 
jamming is 0,603. 
The probability of destroying with 420 projectiles is 0.217. 
217 , 0 75 , 0 · 8 , 0 · 6 , 0 · 603 , 0   
The aerial target is not destroyed because the probability of destruction is smaller than 0,8. 
4. THE CALCULATION OF POSSIBILITIES OF DESTRUCTION FOR 
SYSTEM S3 
4.1 Without using the radioelectronic jamming by the enemy 
Based on data related in table 1,with S3 the possibilities of annihilation are obtained without 
the use of radioelectronic jamming by the enemy, presented in table 3. 
The rate of fire is 1. 
1
60
60

 
The number of projectiles fired by system S3 is 70. 
70 062 , 70 6 · 1 · 677 , 11    fired projectiles 
The probability of destroying with 70 projectiles is 0,201 
0032 , 0 · 70
70 1    e P
    
201 , 0 799 , 0 1 70    P  
The aerial target is not destroyed because the probability of destruction is smaller than 0,8. 
4.2 Using the radioelectronic jamming by the enemy 
Data showed in table 1, are the source for calculating the possibilities of annihilation with 
the use of radioelectronic jamming, presented in table 3. 
Regarding the previous data, note that: 
  The flight duration of the target in the action area (t) is 11,667 s. 
  The rate of fire, in hits/s is 1. 
  The number of projectiles fired by the subunit is 70. 
  The probability of destroying for 70 projectile, without using the radioelectronic 
jamming is 0,201. 
The probability of destroying the target with 70 projectiles is 0.072. 
072 , 0 75 , 0 · 8 , 0 · 6 , 0 · 201 , 0   
The aerial target is not destroyed because the probability of destruction is smaller than  
0,8. According to the above data and calculations for each systems we made a compilation of 
them so the comparative analysis is based on the data in table 3. 
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Tabel 3. Possibilities of destroying 
  without jamming  with jamming 
System  S1  S2  S3  S1  S2  S3 
Number of projectils necessary for the 
destruction of the target  837  735  504  1395  2205  1380 
Number of fired projectiles  560  420  70  560  420  70 
Probability of destruction  0,691  0,603  0,201  0,415  0,217  0,072 
Is the target destroyed?  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Number  of  guns  necessary    for  the 
destruction of the target  9  7  42  15  21  115 
Number  of  additional  guns  for  the 
destruction of the target  3  3  36  9  7  109 
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Fig. 2 Probability of destruction  for each 
system depending on the number of projectiles 
fired  using the radioelectronic jamming by the 
enemy 
Fig. 1 Probability of destruction by the number  
of projectiles fired, without jamming 
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Fig. 4 Probability of destruction  for each systems 
depending on the number of projectiles fired using 
the radioelectronic jamming 
Fig. 3 Probability of destruction  for each 
systems depending on the number of 
projectiles fired without the radioelectronic 
jamming 
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a) without jamming           b)  with jamming 
Fig. 5 a, b Probability of destruction  for each system 
5. THE TRAJECTORY SIMULATION USING THE CATCH UP CURVE 
GUIDANCE METHOD IMPLEMENTED PROGRAM FOR THE SYSTEM S4 
(SURFACE - TO - AIR MISSILE) 
Unlike others three systems, S4 is one of the Surface - to - Air Missile Systems which can be 
easily integrated with the other three ones. 
The catch up curve guidance method means the law of approaching missile to the target, 
that at any time the missile speed vector is oriented in the direction of the target. In this 
method the command signal is proportional to the size of the advance angle (between the 
missile speed vector and missile-target line) that constitutes the variance parameter. 
The target trajectory and missile speed as functions of time for flight conditions should 
be known for drawing the graphic. 
The Missile kinematic trajectory is drawn only in the vertical guidance plane for the 
linear and uniformly target flight situation, and evenly to a report\    /    = 2. 
It is found that in the final portion of the trajectory the rocket turns tightly  approaching 
to the target from the back of it. The trajectories are determined by their overload ratio  d/  n  
Assesment of the missile's trajectory characteristics 
 
Fig. 6 The characteristics of the missile's trajectory 
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Using the notations in figure 1 we can write the kinematic equations of the catch up 
curve method for one of the guidance plans: 
 ̇ =            =      ·cos φ  (6) 
  ̇                 (7) 
where: 
 ̇  –  the distance variation  between the missile and the target; 
    – the radial speed of the target (target speed component oriented in the direction of 
the missile); 
D  ̇ – linear speed of the distance line rotation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to search an optimization for the missile interception path, a program which 
allows to study different approaching trajectories when some parameters are modified proves 
to be very useful. This has implemented the catch up with curve guidance method [4] with 
general characteristics as follows: 
Fig. 7 a, b The case of the impact between the two aerodynamics  vectors 
 
Fig. 7 c, d The case of mising the target 
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After performing of the accounting from the i step, all the characteristics with the i index 
are determined (Ri and Ti are the annotations for the missile and the target position at the 
moment, representing the points on these trajectories, respectively). The succession of the 
calculus at the i+1 step is the following: 
At the i step there are known the missile and target positions Ri and Ti and we have to 
determine the following: 
  The slant range di+1 is determined  
t  :  t v d r 1     
  The target coordinates Ti+1 are determined, using the relations: 
t v X X t t t i i    
1   (8) 
i i t t Y Y 
1   (9) 
  The Ri+1, 
1  i r X  and 
1  i r Y  coordinates of the position of the missile are calculated: 
i r r d X X
i i    
 cos 1 1   (10) 
i i r r d Y Y
i i    
 sin
1   (11) 
  The pitch angle is determined: 
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  The slant range between new positions Ri+1 and Ti+1:  
   
2 2
1 1 1 1        
i i i i r t r t Y Y X X d   (13) 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
If the enemy does not use jamming, according to figure 1 – (that we performed using the 
program Mathcad 15, by generating the schedule based on the number of projectiles fired by 
each system and the probability of their destruction - and figure 5 - that I made in Microsoft 
Excel 2010 based on probabilities of annihilation (destruction) of each subunit ) - we can see 
that S1 and S2 systems, have close values of the probability of destruction (without jamming 
0.691 and 0,602). 
As  for  S3,  its  destruction  probability  is  very  small,  only  0,201  with  a  total  of  70 
projectiles fired. 
The great disadvantage of this system is the low rate of fire per gun, which determines 
the probability of destruction to decrease a lot from the other systems. 
According to table 3, no system was unable to destroy the target because the probability 
of destroying  is smaller than 0,8. 
The specified system in the firing session is S1 because it has the highest probability of 
destruction. 
For an increased probability of destruction we can focus the fire to achieve integrated 
defense. 
To focus fire all systems are indicated because the probability of destruction is very 
high, of about 0.902. 
Regarding to the missile trajectory simulation, by modifying the φt angle corresponding 
to a target maneuver in altitude (H), different situations of interception can be relatively easy 
studied. 
Figures 7a and 7b present the case of impact for the basic hypothesis or when the target 
has/executes a maneuver in altitude, respectively. 
In figures 7c and 7d are presented the case of missing the target for the hypothesis when 
the target maneuvers in H or when the target maneuvers in H and increases the velocity from 
300 m/s to 600 m/s respectively, so exceeding the Air Defense system effective range. 
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